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I. INTRODUCTION
In the late 1980s, filings of class actions declined to the point that
some began to talk of their possible extinction. Paul Carrington was quoted
in the New York Times as stating that "class actions had their day in the sun
and kind of petered out."1  Stephen Yeazell reportedly "wondered aloud
whether he had devoted his career to the study of a nearly-extinct species.
Indeed, the number of class actions filed had been falling since the late
1970s, from over 2500 in 1978 to just over 500 in 1987. 3 But 1987 proved
to be the low point. The number of class actions filed increased steadily
thereafter, and by 2001 filings had risen to over 3000.
4
In 2005, Myriam Gilles again forecast the demise of the class
action. She wrote: "It is likely that, with a handful of exceptions, class
actions will soon be virtually extinct." 5  The leading culprit in this
threatened extinction, according to Professor Gilles, is the arbitration
*John M. Rounds Professor of Law, University of Kansas School of Law. We
appreciate helpful comments from symposium participants as well as Myriam Gilles,
Richard Nagareda, Bo Rutledge, Jean Stemlight, and Steve Ware.
**Gray Plant Mooty, Minneapolis, Minnesota. Mr. Wittrock represented International
Dairy Queen in the litigation described in Part III of this article.
'See Douglas Martin, The Rise and Fall of the Class-Action Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
8, 1988, at B7. The message of the New York Times article, consistent with the
Carrington quote, was that class actions "appear to be dying."
2Stephen B. Burbank & Linda J. Silberman, Civil Procedure Reform in Comparative
Context: The United States of America, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 675, 685 (1997) (describing
remarks of Professor Stephen Yeazell at a meeting of the AALS Section of Civil
Procedure in 1989).3Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, I JELS 459, 491 (2004).
41d. The number of class actions filed fell to 2916 in 2002 and then to 2148 in 2003, but
then increased to 2693 in 2004, the most recent year for which comparable data is
available. See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Annual Report of the Director,
Table X-5 (2001-2004) (see www.uscourts.gov/judbus200l/appendices/xO5sepOl.pdf,
www.uscourts.gov/judbus2004/appendices/x5.pdf).5Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the
Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REv. 373, 375 (2005).
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clause. An arbitration clause, when coupled with a clause waiving class
arbitrations, acts as a "collective action waiver," that, if enforced, would
effectively eliminate the availability of class relief in court and in
arbitration. She concluded: "Assuming the collective action waiver
emerges more or less unscathed from the current round of judicial
challenges, it is only a matter of time before these waivers metastasize
throughout the body of corporate America and bar the majority of class
actions as we know them."7
In this article, we reexamine the future of the class action, with the
benefit of several additional years of case law development and, perhaps, a
different view of arbitration as a means of dispute resolution. A
symposium on franchising is a particularly appropriate setting in which to
undertake such a reexamination because of the important role of franchise
arbitration clauses in the development of American arbitration law, in
particular the law defining the relationship between arbitration and class
actions. The first published opinion in which a court considered the
possibility of class arbitration appears to have been the California Court of
Appeals' opinion in Keating v. Superior Court,8 which arose out of a
dispute between Southland Corporation and its (7-Eleven) franchisees. 9
Before the U.S. Supreme Court, the case became Southland Corp. v.
Keating,'0 and is the leading case on the preemption of state law by the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Edward Wood Dunham, a franchise lawyer
and a participant in this symposium, was one of the first commentators to
note that an arbitration clause might serve as a "class action shield."' 1 He
made his observation in an article describing how "the Subway franchisor,
Doctor's Associates, Inc. (DAI), employed an arbitration clause to block a
state court class action."' 2  Other important developments in U.S.
arbitration law likewise can be traced to the franchise or distributorship
setting. 13
6Professor Gilles also noted the decline of the mass tort class action. Id. at 375. But the
"more significant[]" reason for the feared extinction, according to Gilles, is the
"collective action waiver." Id. at 375-76.
71d. at 377.
8Keating v. Superior Court, 167 Cal. Rptr. 481 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), vacated, 645 P.2d
1192 (Cal. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1
(1984).
9See Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will
the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1, 38 (2000).
10465 U.S. 1 (1984).
"Edward Wood Dunham, The Arbitration Clause as Class Action Shield, 16
FRANCHISE L.J. 141 (1997).
121d
13For other examples, consider the following: (1) Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985), which held that antitrust claims arising
out of an international contract could be arbitrated, involved a contract between an
automobile manufacturer (Mitsubishi) and a dealer (Soler); (2) the first federal statute
to make certain pre-dispute arbitration clauses unenforceable applied to motor vehicle
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Based on our reexamination, we do not see the class action as likely
to become extinct, or even to appear on the endangered species list.
Certainly the raw numbers do not provide evidence of any imminent
"demise" of the class action. The number of class action filings is nowhere
near the low reached in 1987.14 Indeed, the available empirical evidence
suggests that total class action filings may be increasing, although the
evidence is by no means definitive. At a minimum, however, the empirical
evidence certainly does not reveal any imminent extinction of the class
action. 15
More fundamentally, we disagree in two respects with the reasons
given for the class action's predicted demise. First, events have not borne
out the assumption that courts would uphold class arbitration waivers across
the board. 16 We admittedly have the benefit of several more years of legal
development, and thus have been able to observe an increasing number of
franchise contracts-i.e., contracts between motor vehicle manufacturers and dealers;
see Motor Vehicle Franchise Contract Arbitration Fairness Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1226(a);
and (3) the proposed Arbitration Fairness Act includes franchisees with consumers and
employees as parties to be "protected" from pre-dispute arbitration clauses; see
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111 h Cong. § 4 (2009).
14Indeed, class action filings in the studied federal court districts (which accounted for
98% of federal civil filings) increased from 1370 for the six months from July to
December 2001 to 2354 for the six months from January to June 2007. Emery G. Lee
III & Thomas E. Willing, The Impact of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 on the
Federal Courts: Fourth Interim Report to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee
on Civil Rules, Federal Judicial Center 3 (Apr. 2008), available at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/cafaO48.pdf/$file/cafaO4O8.pdf. Those
numbers compare to just over 500 class actions filed for the entire year of 1987. See
supra text accompanying note 3.
15A recent report by the Federal Judicial Center found a 72% increase in class action
filings in the studied federal court districts from 2001 to 2007. Lee & Willing, supra
note 14, at 3. Some of the increase in federal court filings no doubt was due to
enactment of the Class Action Fairness Act, which shifted at least some class actions
from state court to federal court. But ongoing research into California class action
filings, both in federal court and state court, has found that "total class action activity" -
i.e., combined filings in state and federal court - "increased ... [i]n 2005, the year in
which CAFA was enacted." Emery G. Lee IlI & Thomas E. Willing, Progress Report
to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules on the Impact of CAFA on the Federal
Courts, Federal Judicial Center 4-5 (Nov. 2007), available at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/cafaI I07.pdf/$file/cafa l l07.pdf. Certainly a
broader sample than one year of filings in California is necessary to draw any definitive
conclusions. Howard M. Erichson, CAFA's Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 157 U.
PENN. L. REv. 1593, 1609 n.79 (2008). But the more general point holds: that the
empirical evidence does not suggest that the demise of the class action is near.
16Gilles, supra note 5, at 377 (assuming that "the collective action waiver emerges more
or less unscathed from the current round of judicial challenges"). To be clear, the point
here is that subsequent events have undercut one basis for the predicted demise of the
class action, not that the original predictions necessarily were incorrect given the then-
current state of the law.
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courts holding class arbitration waivers to be unenforceable.17  But the
invalidation of class arbitration waivers alone does not necessarily
guarantee the future of the class action. As long as the invalid waiver is
severable from the parties' arbitration agreement, the case will still proceed
in arbitration-but on a class basis rather than an individual basis.
However, an increasing number of franchisors and other parties that draft
form contracts now include nonseverability provisions in their arbitration
clauses, specifying by contract that if the class arbitration waiver is held
invalid, the entire arbitration clause is unenforceable.' 8 The result of such a
clause, in those jurisdictions holding class arbitration waivers invalid, is
that any class claim within the scope of the arbitration clause would
proceed as a putative class action in court. Second, not all contracts include
arbitration clauses or were likely to do so even before the recent round of
court decisions invalidating class arbitration waivers. For those contracts
that do not include arbitration clauses, class relief generally remains
available in court. This second reason for our conclusion was as true in
2005 as it is today-that the decision of a business (including a franchisor)
to include an arbitration clause in a contract is based on a variety of
considerations, not only whether it limits the availability of class relief.' 9
Thus, we would not expect every contract-or even every consumer or
employment contract-to include an arbitration clause.20  The empirical
evidence bears out our belief: less than half of franchise agreements in both
1999 and 2007 include arbitration clauses, 2' and the use of arbitration
clauses varies widely across types of consumer and employment
22contracts. Moreover, the use of arbitration clauses in franchise
agreements has remained constant, despite the persistence of class actions
brought by franchisees against franchisors.23
For these reasons, then, we conclude that arbitration clauses, and
the use of class arbitration waivers, are not likely to cause the class action
17See infra text accompanying notes 89-97.
'
8Christopher R. Drahozal & Quentin R. Wittrock, Is There a Flight from Arbitration?,
37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 71, 108 (2008) (10.7% of franchise arbitration clauses in 2007
included nonseverability provision); Theodore Eisenberg et al., Arbitration's Summer
Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer
Cases, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 871, 884 (2008) ("in 60 percent of the consumer contracts
that contained mandatory arbitration clauses, companies' standard form contracts
deemed those clauses void if the arbitration process allows for class action activity").
'
9Drahozal & Wittrock, supra note 18, at 76-78. But see Eisenberg et al., supra note 18,
at 895-96.20Drahozal & Wittrock, supra note 18, at 78-80.2 Id. at 95.22Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, "Volunteering" to Arbitrate Through
Predispule Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer's Experience, 67 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 63-64 (2004).23See, e.g., John F. Dienelt & Margaret E.K. Middleton, Settling Franchise Class
Actions, 21 FRANCH. L.J. 113, 152 (2002) ("There have already been many franchise
class actions and it seems certain that there will be more.").
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to become extinct. Although we focus on franchise arbitration, much of
what we say has broader application (and we bring in empirical evidence
from outside the franchising context when available). Our analysis in the
paper proceeds in five parts. Part II provides a brief overview of
terminology, distinguishing among "class action waivers," "class arbitration
waivers," and "collective action waivers." Part III examines the use of
arbitration clauses as a "class action shield"-i.e., to contract out of class
relief in court. Part IV considers class arbitration as a substitute for class
actions in court. Part V then discusses the use and enforceability of class
arbitration waivers. Finally, Part VI examines the future of class actions, in
light of party preferences for the means and forum of dispute resolution.
II. TERMINOLOGY: CLASS ACTION WAIVERS, CLASS
ARBITRATION WAIVERS, AND COLLECTIVE ACTION WAIVERS
Courts and commentators use three different phrases to describe
contract provisions that may restrict the ability of parties to obtain class
relief: class action waivers, class arbitration waivers, and collective action
waivers. To make clear how we use those phrases, we begin with some
definitions.
"Class Action Waiver" - a provision in a contract by which the
parties waive the ability to bring a class action in court. Contracts with
forum selection clauses sometimes include provisions waiving class
actions,24 although the legal effectiveness of the provisions is uncertain.
2 5
An arbitration clause also functions as a class action waiver, as discussed in
Part 111.26 Courts sometimes use the phrase "class action waiver" to refer to
a clause by which parties agree that any arbitration will proceed only on an
24See infra Appendix.
25Hans Smit, Class Actions and Their Waivers in Arbitration, 15 AM. REV. INT'L ARB.
199, 203 (2004); Elizabeth Thornburg, Designer Trials, 2006 J. DisP. RESOL. 181,194
("Would class action waivers be enforced in court proceedings pursuant to a pre-
litigation contract? Those states that find waivers enforceable in the arbitration context
are likely to approve it in the courts. The arbitration cases have already determined that
class action waivers are not unconscionable under those states' contract law. The courts
will explain that they are simply enforcing the parties' agreement. Those states that find
such clauses unconscionable in the arbitration setting will likely reach similar
conclusions regarding class action waivers for court proceedings - their decisions turn
on the importance of the class action as a remedy, and this remains true for court
actions."); see Dix v. ICT Group, Inc., 161 P.3d 1016, 1025 (Wash. 2007) ("Because
AOL's forum selection clause precludes class actions for small-value [Consumer
Protection Act] claims and there is no feasible alternative avenue for seeking relief on
such claims, the forum selection clause is invalid and unenforceable... .26See infra text accompanying notes 33-34.
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individual and not a class basis.27 In this article, we limit the meaning of
''class action waiver" to contract provisions that preclude class relief in
court, and do not include contract provisions that preclude class relief in
arbitration (which we refer to as "class arbitration waivers").
"Class Arbitration Waiver" - a provision in an arbitration clause by
which the parties agree that arbitration will not proceed on a class basis.
28
It differs from a class action waiver in that a class arbitration waiver
precludes class relief in arbitration, while a class action waiver precludes
class relief in court. Referring to such a clause as a "waiver" of class
arbitration may be a misnomer. Arbitration is a matter of contract, and
parties cannot be required to arbitrate unless they have agreed to do so. 29
By including language limiting the availability of class relief in arbitration,
parties are making clear that they have not agreed to class arbitration.
Arguably, they are not waiving some otherwise available right, but are
defining the scope of their agreement to arbitrate. 30 Nevertheless, because
such provisions commonly are called class arbitration waivers, we will use
that terminology in this article.
"Collective Action Waiver" - a provision (or provisions) by which
the parties waive any ability to proceed on a class basis, either in court or in
arbitration.31 An arbitration clause, which prevents a party to the clause
from proceeding in a class action in court, and a class arbitration waiver,
which prevents the party from proceeding in a class arbitration, together
would act as a collective action waiver.
27See, e.g., Lowden v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 512 F.3d 1213, 1219 (9t, Cir. 2008);
Skirchak v. Dynamics Research Corp., 508 F.3d 49, 53-54 (1st Cir. 2007); Dale v.
Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216, 1218 (1 11h Cir. 2007).28For sample clauses, see infra Appendix.29E.g., First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995); AT&T
Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986).
3°Hans Smit takes this point one step further, arguing that if the court or arbitrator
enforces the class arbitration waiver the effect of the waiver is to exclude class claims
from arbitration and permit the claimant to bring a class action in court. Smit, supra
note 25, at 209 ("If the conclusion that a waiver of class action in arbitration is intended
to operate only in the arbitration is correct, all that the proponents of the waiver end up
with is a judicial class action rather than an arbitral one."); see also Sternlight, supra
note 9, at 91("To the extent a court believes there is ambiguity as to whether a provision
prohibiting class actions in arbitration was intended to foreclose class action litigation
as well, the ambiguity should be read in favor of the plaintiff and against the drafter to
allow for class litigation.").
3'Gilles, supra note 5, at 375-376. More broadly, a collective action waiver might be a
clause that waives not only class relief, but also the ability to join other parties in the
case. We do not use the phrase so broadly here, focusing instead on the availability of
class relief.
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III. ARBITRATION CLAUSES AS CLASS ACTION WAIVERS
Businesses include arbitration clauses in their standard form
contracts, including franchise agreements, for a variety of reasons.32 One
reason, although certainly not the only one, is that the arbitration clause acts
as a class action waiver because it precludes the parties to the clause from
proceeding on a class basis in court.3 3 The rationale is straightforward.
Parties who have agreed to arbitrate have, by contract, agreed to have their
claims resolved in arbitration instead of in court. Permitting them to
participate in a class action in court would circumvent their agreement to
arbitrate, contrary to the mandate of the Federal Arbitration Act that
arbitration agreements be enforced according to their terms. 34
Edward Wood Dunham was one of the earliest to have made this
point in print. In a 1997 article in the Franchise Law Journal,35 he
explained that "[f]ranchisors with an arbitration clause in their franchise
agreements have an effective tool for managing these new class action
risks., 36 At the time, franchisors were still reeling from the $390 million
class action judgment in Broussard v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops,
Inc.,37 which was later reversed on appeal.38 Dunham pointed out that under
the then-existing case law, courts typically would not order arbitration on a
class basis unless the parties had expressly agreed to class arbitration. As a
result, "[t]he franchisor with an arbitration clause should be able to require
each franchisee in the potential class to pursue individual claims in a
32See Drahozal & Wittrock, supra note 18, at 76-78.33See, e.g., Dienelt & Middleton, supra note 23, at 158-59 (describing series of cases
that "illustrate how arbitration clauses may be used to diminish drastically the size of
the class, and, in some instances, to block class litigation altogether"); Kevin M.
Kennedy & Bethany Appleby, Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle: A New Day for
Class Actions?, 23 FRANCHISE. L.J. 84, 84 (2003) ("during the past decade, arbitration
clauses have repeatedly enabled franchisors to 'break up' attempts by franchisees to
assert class or consolidated claims"); Robert S. Safi, Note, Beyond Unconscionability:
Preserving the Class Mechanism Under State Law in the Era of Consumer Arbitration,
83 TEX. L. REv. 1715, 1724 (2005) ("The CAP [class arbitration preclusion clause] is
an invention of fairly recent vintage, born of necessity. Historically, defendants could
rest assured that a binding arbitration clause buried within the terms of a contract of
adhesion would foreclose the possibility of classwide exposure, because courts
P4erceived the class mechanism and arbitration as incompatible.")
49 U.S.C. §§ 2-4 (2000).35Dunham, supra note 11, at 141.36
1d
37155 F.3d 331, 337 (4th Cir. 1998). Dunham cited Meineke Mufflers as "a bracing
reminder that franchising is full of potentially catastrophic litigation risks." Dunham,
supra note 11, at 141.38Meineke Mufflers, 155 F.3d at 331.
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separate arbitration." 39 Dunham concluded: "An arbitration clause may not
be an invincible shield against class action litigation, but it is surely one of
the strongest pieces of armor available to the franchisor.
' 40
The effectiveness of an arbitration clause as a class action waiver
can be seen in Collins v. International Dairy Queen, Inc.4 1 Collins began in
1994 as a federal-court action by six Georgia franchisees of the Dairy
Queen® system of quick-service restaurants who asserted antitrust and
contract claims against the franchisor. The plaintiffs alleged that they were
being overcharged for supplies approved by franchisor American Dairy
Queen (ADQ) and sold to franchisees through International Dairy Queen
(IDQ), its parent company.42  Later, other claims were added by
amendment, and in 1996-at the suggestion of the district court itself-the
named plaintiffs sought certification to represent a class of all Dairy Queen
store operators in the United States (except those operating in Texas). 43
Following certification of the class in August 1996, 44 and denial of
the defendants' summary judgment motion a week later,45 a major focus of
the case became determining which class members' claims were precluded
by their arbitration provisions. The first such order came down in
November 1996, as the court modified one of the classes to consist of
"Dairy Queen and Dairy Queen/Brazier franchisees in the United States,
except those franchisees who are located in the state of Texas and those
franchisees who are territorial operators, and except for those franchisees
whose individual franchise agreements provide for arbitration."'  Two
months later, the court redefined the classes once again, eliminating
additional would-be class members who had arbitration agreements in their
franchise agreements. 47 Still other class members-those who were part of
a sub-class that claimed breach of a 1974 class action settlement
39 Dunham, supra note 11, at 141. As an illustration of his argument, Dunham pointed
to litigation between Doctor's Associates and Subway franchisees, in which each of the
franchisee class representatives was party to an arbitration clause. Id.4°Id. at 142.
41 Civil Action No. 94-95-4-MAC(WDO), filed in the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Georgia in 1994. For reported decisions in the case, see infra
notes 42-50.
42 Collins v. Int'l Dairy Queen, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 875, 878-84 (M.D. Ga. 1996).
43 Id. (Stores in Texas at the time had a somewhat different menu and supply systems,
and operators there were not part of the Dairy Queen Operator's Association, which
was funding the Collins suit.)
44 Collins v. Int'l Dairy Queen, Inc., 168 F.R.D. 668, 678 (M.D. Ga. 1996).
45 Collins, 939 F. Supp. At 884.
46Collins v. Int'l Dairy Queen, Inc., No. 94-95-MAC (WDO) (unreported decision of
Nov. 20, 1996) (on file with the authors) (emphasis added). The Dairy Queen franchise
system is one of the oldest such chains in the United States. As such, many of the older
franchise agreements (which were perpetual and remained in place) pre-date ADQ's
decision in the 1970s to begin including arbitration provisions in its franchise
agreement.
4fCollins, 169 F.R.D. at 694-95.
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agreement-were removed by the Georgia court in early 1998 because
since 1974, they had signed franchise agreements that required arbitration.48
Several months later, groups of subfranchisees (those who did not obtain
the franchise directly through ADQ but through a "territory
operator"/master franchisee instead) were also eliminated if they had agreed
to arbitrate "all claims related to" their agreement, as ADQ was found to be
a third-party beneficiary of the subfranchise agreement and its arbitration
clause.49 Through these various orders, the court reduced the size of the
class by some 2,000 claimants, from over 4,000 to roughly 2,000.' o
The end result of Collins, like most certified class actions, was a
class-action settlement agreement. 5' The parties settled for a fraction of the
hundreds of millions of dollars sought, with the vast majority of the
defendants' monetary payment (excluding payments to counsel) being
made to the Dairy Queen advertising fund.52 The settlement was seen as a
"win-win" for franchisees and franchisor alike because of the increased
advertising that would result from the settlement funds.
The pertinent lessons from Collins are many. First, the court
excluded from the class action all those franchisees whose franchise
agreements included arbitration clauses; as to those franchisees, the
arbitration clause acted as a waiver of the ability to proceed on a class basis
in court. Second, had all franchisees' agreements contained arbitration
clauses, there likely would not have been a class action at all or a class
action settlement (given the general unavailability of class arbitration at the
time). Third, even the district court judge, who had suggested the class
procedure and entered various preliminary rulings against the defendants on
substantive issues, acknowledged that binding arbitration provisions
trumped the ability to be part of a class action. In short, Collins plainly
illustrates Dunham's characterization of the arbitration clause as a "class
action shield.,
53
48Collins, 990 F. Supp. at 1473.49Collins v. Int'l Dairy Queen, Inc., 1998 WL 136501, at *8 (M.D. Ga. 1998).50The defendants also filed an overall motion to "decertify" the class, which the court
denied on March 31, 1999. See Collins v. Int'l Dairy Queen, Inc., 186 F.R.D. 689
(M.D. Ga. 1999). Pursuant to then-new Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), IDQ and
ADQ asked for an interlocutory appeal on the class decertification issue. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit agreed to hear the appeal, but the case
settled prior to the appeal being decided.5
'Class Settlement Agreement, Collins v. Int'l Dairy Queen, Inc., Civil Action No. 94-
95-4-MAC(WDO) (M.D. Ga.) (dated Mar. 6, 2000, as clarified Apr. 28, 2000) (on file
with the authors).521d. at 27-32.53Dunham, supra note 11, at 141.
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IV. CLASS ARBITRATION AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR CLASS ACTIONS
Parties who have agreed to arbitration are not proper parties to a
class action in court. But in recent years, the number of arbitrations
conducted on a class basis has increased significantly, making class
arbitration a possible substitute for class actions.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Green Tree Financial
Corp. v. Bazzle,54 virtually all courts refused to order arbitration to proceed
on a class basis unless the parties had expressly agreed to class arbitration.
55
As the Seventh Circuit explained in Champ v. Siegel Trading Co:
56
The parties' arbitration agreement makes no
mention of class' arbitration. For a federal court to read
such a term into the parties' agreement would "disrupt[] the
negotiated risk/benefit allocation and direct[] [the parties]
to proceed with a different sort of arbitration... We thus
adopt the rationale of several other circuits and hold that
section 4 of the FAA forbids federal judges from ordering
class arbitration where the parties' arbitration agreement is
silent on the matter.0
7
Not surprisingly, arbitration clauses almost never provide for arbitration to
proceed on a class basis.58 As a result, prior to Bazzle, arbitration rarely
occurred on a class basis.
59
54539 U.S. 444 (2003).
55See, e.g., P. Christine Deruelle & Robert Clayton Roesch, Gaming the Rigged Class
Arbitration Game: How We Got Here and Where We Go Now - Part I, METROPOLITAN
CORP. COUNSEL, Aug. 2007, at 9 ("Prior to Bazzle, the Courts of Appeals for the
Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits had
determined that class or consolidated arbitration of claims was improper where the
arbitration agreement was silent on the permissibility of such proceedings."); Kennedy
& Appleby, supra note 33, at 84 ("Before Green Tree, whether, under the FAA, a class
or consolidated arbitration was available appeared to be an issue for a court, not an
arbitrator, to decide. In addition, the clear weight of federal authority held that absent an
express agreement of the parties, there could be no class or consolidated arbitrations.").
5655 F.3d 269 (7th Cir. 1995).
571d. at 275.58In a sample of franchise dispute resolution clauses, two clauses provide for arbitration
to proceed on a class basis for a narrow category of claims. See infra text
accompanying note 82. But see Oral Arg. Tr. 4, Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, No.
02-634 (Apr. 22, 2003), available at
www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/02-634.pdf (Carter G.
Phillips) ("I've never read a class arbitration clause in any contract, and I'm told that no
one's ever even attempted to draft a class arbitration clause.").
59An exception was California. The California Court of Appeal had ordered arbitration
to proceed on a class basis in the well-known Southland case. Keating v. Superior
Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1209-10 (Cal. 1982), rev'd on other grounds sub noma, Southland
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That was where the law stood when the United States Supreme
Court decided Bazzle.6° In Bazzle, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
resolve the question "[w]hether the Federal Arbitration Act . . . prohibits
class-action procedures from being superimposed onto an arbitration
agreement that does not provide for class-action arbitration., 61 In deciding
the case, the Court did not reach that question. It issued four separate
opinions, none of which commanded a majority.62 The plurality opinion
concluded that the arbitrator, rather than a court, must decide whether the
contract (which was silent on class arbitration) permitted arbitration to
proceed on a class basis. 63 Because the arbitrator had not yet made such a
determination, the Court vacated the judgment below and remanded the
case for further proceedings.64 Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment,
but only to ensure that there was a judgment of the Court.65
As a legal matter, Bazzle's reach is somewhat uncertain because
there was no opinion of the Court.66 As a practical matter, however, Bazzle
opened up a whole new arena for claimants seeking to bring class claims.
The practice of the American Arbitration Association in response to Bazzle
is described below, although at least one other arbitration provider, JAMS,
has also promulgated rules governing class arbitrations.67
Shortly after Bazzle, the AAA promulgated Supplementary Rules
of Class Arbitration,68 modeled on the class action provisions of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Under its current policy, the AAA will
administer arbitrations on a class basis "if (1) the underlying agreement
specifies that disputes arising out of the parties' agreement shall be resolved
by arbitration in accordance with any of the Association's rules, and (2) the
agreement is silent with respect to class claims, consolidation or joinder of
claims. '69 If, however, the arbitration agreement "prohibits class claims,
consolidation or joinder," the AAA will not administer a class arbitration
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). For a description of several early class arbitrations,
see Stemlight, supra note 9, at 41 n.149.60Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 444.
61Petition for Certiorari, Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, No. 02-634 (Oct. 23, 2002).62Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 446.631d. at 453.
64Id.
651d. at 455 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
66See Imre S. Szalai, The New ADR: Aggregate Dispute Resolution and Green Tree
Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 41 CAL. W.L. REv. 1, 40-41 (2004).
67See JAMS Class Action Procedures (Feb. 2005), available at
http://www.jamsadr.com/rules/classaction.asp. For a description of the controversy
over changes in JAMS' policy toward class arbitration, see Gilles, supra note 5, at 411-
12.
68American Arbitration Association, Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations
(effective Oct. 8, 2003), available at www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=21936 [hereinafter AAA
Class Arbitration Rules].
69AAA Policy on Class Arbitrations (July 14, 2005), available at
www.adr.org/sp.asp?id= 28779.
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"unless an order of a court directs the parties to the underlying dispute to
submit any aspect of their dispute involving class claims, consolidation,
joinder or the enforceability of such provisions, to an arbitrator or to the
Association. ,70
Since issuing its class arbitration rules, the AAA has had a steady
flow of class arbitration filings. As shown in Figure 1,71 claimants have
filed roughly 50 class arbitration cases per year, although the filings
dropped to 36 in 2007. The AAA class arbitration docket includes several
franchisors as respondents, including Blimpie International and Snap-On
Tools Co. 72 Although the number of class arbitration filings is small when
compared to the number of federal court class actions, for some prospective
class action claimants, class arbitration provides a possible substitute for
class actions.
Figure 1. AAA Class Arbitration Filings
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70Id.
7
'Thanks to Mark Weidemaier providing us with the data on AAA class arbitration
filings through early 2007. We collected the data for the rest of 2007 from the
Searchable AAA Class Arbitration Docket, http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=25562 (last
visited Mar. 12, 2009). The AAA has reported similar, although not identical, data.
William K. Slate 1I & Eric P. Tuchmann, Class Action Arbitrations, 11 INT'L ARB. L.
REv. 50, 53 (2008) (reporting data "for the period October 8, 2003 through January 1,
2008") ("Filings by year are as follows: 2003, 6 cases filed; 2004, 65 cases; 2005, 47
cases; 2006, 58 cases; 2007, 41 cases.").72Searchable AAA Class Arbitration Docket, http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=25562 (last
visited May 27, 2008); see Slate & Tuchmann, supra note 71, at 53 ("employment and
franchise cases are numerically most represented in the current caseload").
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The AAA has reported various characteristics of its class arbitration
docket as of January 1, 2008. In addition to the number of cases filed,73 the
AAA reported:
* "Of those class actions that have reached the arbitrator
selection stage, 76 are utilizing a single arbitrator and 20 are
proceeding with a three-arbitrator panel. 74
* "Arbitrators have issued 'clause construction' decisions in 71
cases and in three others, the parties have stipulated as to clause
construction. Arbitrators have issued 'class certification'
decisions in 10 cases.
75
* "Cases have closed for the following reasons: settled, 54 cases;
withdrawn, 16 cases; transferred, 12 cases; consent awards, 3
cases; closed administratively, 6 cases; using a limited service
to conclude the case, 1 cases; total awarded, 11 cases though
none of the awards was on the merits.,
76
Little other empirical work has been done on AAA (or other) class
arbitrations. One exception is a study of AAA "clause construction awards"
by Deruelle and Roesch. 77 "Clause construction awards" are awards that
determine whether the parties' arbitration agreement permits arbitration to
proceed on a class basis.78 Deruelle and Roesch reported that, "[a]s of June
15, 2007, AAA arbitrators have rendered 51 Clause Construction Awards
concerning otherwise silent arbitration agreements, and in all but two of
those decisions, the arbitrators have allowed class wide proceedings."
79
Thus, when the arbitration clause is silent on the availability of class
arbitration, AAA arbitrators have consistently permitted the arbitration to
proceed on a class basis.
No published studies have looked at the outcomes of class
arbitrations, presumably, because (like class actions in court) most cases are
settled. As the AAA has indicated, of the cases on its class arbitration
docket, "[n]o case has been awarded on the merits of the dispute."80
Obviously, some sort of evaluation would need to be done before the
suitability of class arbitration as a substitute for class actions could be
determined.
73Slate & Tuchmann, supra note 71, at 53.
741d.
751d
761d. As an example of a final award that was not on the merits, the AAA reported "one
instance where the arbitrator determined that the proper jurisdiction for the type [of]
relief sought could only be granted by a given state's attorney general's office." Id.77Deruelle & Roesch, supra note 55, at 9.
78AAA Class Arbitration Rules, supra note 68, Rule 3.79Deruelle & Roesch, supra note 55, at 9.
80Slate & Tuchmann, supra note 71, at 53.
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V. CONTRACTING AROUND CLASS ARBITRATION
If avoiding class relief is one of the reasons franchisors (and other
drafting parties) use arbitration clauses one would expect them to respond
to the availability of class arbitration by including a class arbitration waiver
in their contract. Indeed, Justice Stevens predicted as much during oral
argument in Bazzle when he asked: "Does this case have any real future
significance, because isn't it fairly clear that all the arbitration agreements
in the future will prohibit class actions? ' 81 This part discusses both the
extent to which franchisors and other drafting parties include class
arbitration waivers in their arbitration clauses, as well as the outcome of
legal challenges to the enforceability of such provisions.
A. The Use of Class Arbitration Waivers
The use of class arbitration waivers varies depending on the type of
contract. Franchisors have modified their arbitration clauses in much the
way predicted by Justice Stevens. In 1999, just over 50% (15 of 28, or
53.6%) of franchise arbitration clauses in a sample of franchise dispute
resolution clauses included some form of class arbitration waiver. By
2007, almost 80% (22 of 28, or 78.6%) of those arbitration clauses included
class arbitration waivers. Table 1 summarizes the clauses.
Table 1. Class Arbitration and Class Action Provisions in Franchise
Agreements
1999 2007
Class Arbitration Waiver 15 22
(53.6%) (78.6%)
Waives Class Arbitration 11 (39.3%) 15 (53.6%)
Waives Class Arbitration; 0 (0%) 3 (10.7%)
Nonseverability Provision
Waives Class Arbitration; Option 0 (0%) 1 (3.6%)
81Oral Arg. Tr. 55, Green Tree Fin'l Corp. v. Bazzle, No. 02-634 (Apr. 22, 2003),
available at www.supremecourtus.gov/oralarguments/argument-transcripts/02-
634.pdf (Stevens, J.).82Drahozal & Wittrock, supra note 18, at 108). (For a description of the sample, see id.
at 90-94.)
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Regarding Provider
No Joinder or Consolidation 2 (7.1%) 2 (7.1%)
Individual Proceedings Only 2 (7.1%) 1 (3.6%)
Permits Class Arbitration for Specified 2 2
Type of Claim; Otherwise Waives Class (7.1%) (7.1%)
Arbitration
Permits Consolidation and Class Actions in 1 1
Court, but Waives Class Arbitration (3.6%) (3.6%)
None 10 3
(35.7%) (10.7%)
By comparison, the use of class arbitration waivers in other
standard form contracts is more varied (and evidence on any change over
time is lacking). Demaine and Hensler, in their 2004 study of consumer
arbitration clauses, found that "[s]ixteen of the fifty-two arbitration clauses
(30.8%) explicitly prohibit class actions with the arbitration proceeding,
and none of the remaining clauses explicitly provide for class actions." 83 In
2008, Eisenberg et al. found that 100% (20 of 20) of the consumer contracts
they studied (principally credit card and cell phone contracts) included class
arbitration waivers. 84 By comparison, none (0 of 13) of the employment
contracts (which, given that their source was SEC filings, presumably were
employment contracts of corporate executives) and only two of seven
(28.6%) of the other "material" contracts in their sample included class
arbitration waivers.85 As a result, Eisenberg et al. concluded, "arbitration
clauses seek to completely preclude aggregation of small plaintiff claims
into economically viable actions. 86
83Demaine & Hensler, supra note 22, at 65. Mark Weidemaier found a much smaller
frequency of class arbitration waivers in a sample of arbitration clauses giving rise to
AAA class arbitrations See W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Arbitration and the Individuation
Critique, 49 ARiz. L. REv. 69, 85 (2007) (sample of 32 agreements in AAA class
arbitrations) ("Of these, 5 of the 16 (31%) of the consumer agreements forbid class
actions, but none of the 16 employment agreements contain a similar term."). The
smaller frequency of class arbitration waivers is not surprising, given that the AAA
refuses to administer class arbitrations when the arbitration clause includes a class
arbitration waiver unless directed to do so by a court. See supra text accompanying note
70.84Eisenberg et al., supra note 18, at 884.
851d.
861d. at 896.
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By contrast, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler reported that "[n]ot a
single EULA [end-user license agreement] out of 597 includes a class-
action waiver."87 Her conclusion is directly contrary to that of Eisenberg et
al.: "Although much analysis remains to be done, these results immediately
cast doubt on casual claims that sellers' rampant use of choice of forum and
arbitration clauses deprive buyers of their day in court, or that sellers are
shielding themselves from liability by making it impossible for buyers to
aggregate low-value claims.
88
B. The Enforceability of Class Arbitration Waivers
Courts are divided over the enforceability of class arbitration
waivers. As the Washington Supreme Court recently has stated, "[t]here is
a clear split of authority., 89 A number of courts (particularly federal courts)
have upheld class arbitration waivers. 90 But an increasing number of courts
(particularly state courts) have struck down the provisions9' (including a
pair of cases from the California Court of Appeal that invalidated class
arbitration waivers in franchise agreements).92 These decisions are based
87Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, "Unfair" Dispute Resolution Clauses: Much Ado About
Nothing?, in BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS 45, 51 (0. Ben-
Shahar ed., 2007).881d.
89Scott v. Cingular Wireless, 161 P.3d 1000, 1004 (Wash. 2007).
9 Johnson v. West Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366 (3d Cir. 2000); Snowden v.
CheckPoint Check Cashing, 290 F.3d 631 (4th Cir. 2002); Livingston v. Associates
Fin., Inc., 339 F.3d 553 (7th Cir. 2003); Iberia Credit Bureau v. Cingular Wireless
LLC, 379 F.3d 159 (5th Cir. 2004); Stenzel v. Dell, Inc., 870 A.2d 133, 144 (Me. 2005)
(applying Texas law); see Spann v. American Express Travel Related Services Co., 224
S.W.3d 698, 714 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) ("with the exception of courts sitting in
California, the vast majority of state and federal courts that have considered the
question have rejected the argument that class action and class arbitration waiver
clauses are unconscionable per se"). At least one state has expressly authorized class
arbitration waivers in consumer credit transactions. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 70C-4-
105(l)-(2) ("In accordance with this section, a creditor may contract with the debtor of
an open-end consumer credit contract for a waiver by the debtor of the right to initiate
or participate in a class action related to the open-end consumer credit contract.")
(requiring notice in bold type or all capital letters).
91Scott, 161 P.3d at 1004 (citing cases); see infra text accompanying notes 95-97.92Independent Ass'n of Mailbox Center Owners, Inc. v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. Rptr.3d
659, 671 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) ("it was error not to strike the ban on group arbitration
from the JAMS agreement on this record"); McGuire v. CoolBrands Smoothies
Franchise, LLC, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6816, at *38 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 22,
2007) ("We conclude that in the context of adhesive contract involving franchisees, a
vulnerable group widely recognized as needing protection, an inherently one-sided
provision barring class or consolidated proceedings, whether in arbitration or in the
courts, is unconscionable under California law in the absence of evidence establishing
otherwise.").
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on several theories-that the waivers were unconscionable,93 that they
precluded the claimants from vindicating their statutory rights,94 or that they
acted as improper exculpatory clauses. 95 Several recent decisions have
distinguished between high-value claims and low-value claims, striking
down class arbitration waivers only in cases involving the latter.96 In short,
courts have taken diverse approaches.97
93E.g., Skirchak v. Dynamics Research Corp., 508 F.3d 49, 51-52 (1st Cir. 2007)
("Based on the particular facts of this case, we uphold the striking of the class action
waiver on grounds of unconscionability"); Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs.,
Inc., 498 F.3d 976, 986 (9t' Cir. 2007) (holding class arbitration waiver
"unconscionable and unenforceable under California law"); Tillman v. Commercial
Credit Loans, Inc., 655 S.E.2d 362, 373 (N.C. 2008) (holding that "the provisions of the
arbitration clause [including a prohibition on joinder and class actions], taken together,
render it substantively unconscionable because the provisions do not provide plaintiffs
with a forum in which they can effectively vindicate their rights"); Fiser v. Dell
Computer Corp., 188 P.3d 1215, 1221 (N.M. 2008) ("because there has been such an
overwhelming showing of substantive unconscionability," class arbitration waiver "is
unconscionable under New Mexico law").
94E.g., Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 64 (1st Cir. 2006) (concluding that
several provisions in arbitration clause, including class arbitration bar, "would prevent
the vindication of statutory rights," and severing invalid provisions).
95E.g., Scott, 161 P.3d at 1007-08 ("We ... conclude that since this clause bars any class
action, in arbitration or without, it functions to exculpate the drafter from liability for a
broad range of undefined wrongful conduct, including potentially intentional wrongful
conduct, and that such exculpation clauses are substantively unconscionable.").
96Muhammad v. County Bank of Rehobeth Beach Delaware, 912 A.2d 88, 100-01 (N.J.
2006) ("We hold, therefore, that the presence of the class-arbitration waiver in
Muhammad's consumer arbitration agreement renders that agreement unconscionable,"
severing invalid class arbitration; "availability of attorneys' fees ... is not dispositive in
the instant case because the damages sought by Muhammad and those she seeks to
represent are small"); Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, 912 A.2d 104, 115 (2006)
(distinguishing Muhammad, supra, because "Harris's claim is not the type of low-value
suit that would not be litigated absent the availability of a class proceeding," citing her
"substantial" damages, risk of losing her home, and fact that "all of the statutes under
which Harris seeks relief provide for attorneys' fees and costs to prevailing plaintiffs");
Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216, 1221 (11th Cir. 2007) (invalidating class
arbitration waiver and distinguishing Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance of Ga., 400
F.3d 868 (1 1th Cir. 2005), and Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala., 244 F.3d 814,
819 (1 1th Cir. 2001), which upheld class arbitration waivers, on ground that "both
Jenkins and Randolph involved claims for which attorneys' fees and other costs were
recoverable"); Carideo v. Dell, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78951, at *13 (W.D. Wash.
Oct. 15, 2007) (upholding class arbitration waiver and distinguishing Scott v. Cingular
Wireless on ground that "[u]nlike the 'trivial' hidden fees of $1 and $45 at issue in Scott,
Plaintiffs allege actual damages between $1,300 and $1,700, plus statutory and punitive
damages, interest, and attorney's fees").97The uncertainty is compounded by new varieties of arbitration clauses that are
"designed to make individual arbitration attractive to ... customers and their attorneys
(if any), even when the amount of the claim is modest," which have not yet been widely
litigated. Brief of AT&T Mobility LLC as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party
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A key unsettled issue is whether the Federal Arbitration Act
preempts court decisions finding class arbitration waivers unconscionable.
Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act makes arbitration clauses "valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract., 98  The Supreme Court has
construed the saving clause in section 2 as permitting courts to invalidate
arbitration clauses only using "[g]enerally applicable contract defenses." 99
The doctrine of unconscionability is certainly a defense applicable to
contracts generally. The question is whether courts are applying the
doctrine to arbitration clauses in a permissible way.100
Courts now appear to be divided on the question of whether the
FAA preempts state applications of the unconscionability doctrine to
arbitration clauses.10' In Ting v. AT&T,10 2 the Ninth Circuit held a class
arbitration waiver unconscionable and concluded that its holding was not
preempted by the FAA.10 3 It reasoned that, "[b]ecause unconscionability is
a generally applicable contract defense, it may be applied to invalidate an
arbitration agreement without contravening § 2 of the FAA."' 04  By
contrast, the Third Circuit, in Gay v. CreditInform,10 5 concluded that
Pennsylvania unconscionability decisions were preempted by the FAA,
explaining as follows:
[I]t is perfectly obvious that Gay relies on the
uniqueness of the arbitration provision in framing her
unconscionability argument. . . . [S]he contends that the
provision is unconscionable because of what it provides,
i.e., arbitration of disputes on an individual basis in place
of litigation possibly brought on a class action basis. Thus,
with all due respect to the Pennsylvania Superior Court, we
15-19, T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Laster, 128 S.Ct. 2500 (2008) (No. 07-976) (describing
so-called "third-generation arbitration provisions").
989 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
99E.g., Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).
l°°See Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987) (dicta) (stating that a court may
not "rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law
holding that enforcement would be unconscionable, for this would enable the court to
effect what we hold today the state legislature cannot"); Doctor's Associates, Inc. v.
Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 n.3 (1996) (dicta) (same). For example, a court could not
find an arbitration clause to be unconscionable because it prevents a case from
proceeding in court before a jury because all arbitration clauses have that effect. See
Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 393, 410-11
(2004).
0'lLowden v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 512 F.3d 1213, 1219-21 (9th Cir. 2008); Scott, 161
P.3d at 1008-09.
'02319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003).
"°
31d. at 1150 n.15.
104Id.
105511 F.3d 369 (3d Cir. 2007).
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will not apply state law ... and thereby interfere with the
appropriate application of the FAA. The Commerce and
Supremacy Clauses of the United States Constitution are
implicated here. 1
06
So far, the Supreme Court has declined to review the issue. 10 7 Unless the
Supreme Court holds that the FAA preempts state unconscionability
doctrine,' 0 8 the diversity of state approaches to the enforceability of class
arbitration waivers is likely to persist. In some states, class arbitration
waivers will be enforceable, while in others, class arbitration waivers will
not be enforceable.
VI. ARBITRATION AND THE FUTURE OF THE CLASS ACTION
The use of arbitration clauses has changed the legal landscape
concerning class actions. But in our view, arbitration clauses have not
made class actions into an endangered species for two principal reasons.
First, a number of courts have invalidated class arbitration waivers as
unconscionable. The result has been the continued filing of class actions in
court, because, in at least some cases, both parties to the arbitration
agreement preferred class actions over class arbitrations. Second, the use of
pre-dispute arbitration clauses varies widely in different types of contracts.
So long as not all contracts include arbitration clauses, and there is no
indication that they will, class actions will continue to be brought in court.
A. Class Arbitration Waivers and Nonseverability Provisions
An increasing number of courts have held that class arbitration
waivers are unenforceable, as discussed above. 10 9 The effect of these cases
on the future of the class action depends on whether the invalid class
arbitration waiver is severable from the rest of the arbitration clause. If the
class arbitration waiver is not severable, the invalidity of the waiver will
infect the rest of the arbitration clause and invalidate the entire clause. As a
'
061d. at 395.1
°
7T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Laster, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 25265 (9th Cir. Oct. 16, 2007),
cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 2500 (2008); see also Gentry v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 556,
569 (Cal. 2007) ("Nor do we accept Circuit City's argument that a rule invalidating
class arbitration waivers discriminates against arbitration clauses in violation of the
Federal Arbitration Act"), cert. denied, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 3000 (U.S. Mar. 31, 2008)
(No. 07-998).
108And so long as a federal statute like the Arbitration Fairness Act does not pass. See
supra note 13. Obviously, if federal law makes pre-dispute arbitration clauses
unenforceable in consumer, employment, and franchise contracts the issue of the
enforceability of class arbitration waivers essentially becomes moot.
l°9See supra text accompanying notes 93-97.
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result, the case will proceed in court-possibly as a class action. If the
class arbitration waiver is severable, the court will strike the waiver but
nonetheless send the case to arbitration. The result is a contract with an
arbitration clause that is silent on whether class arbitration is permitted,
which likely will result in the arbitration proceeding on a class basis." 0
Cases on severability typically turn on factors such as the language
of the arbitration clause, the number of unenforceable clauses, and the
like. 11  One might expect the drafting party to prefer to sever the
unenforceable provisions and have the case nonetheless proceed in
arbitration. That seems to be the preference of the drafting party in most
cases-the exception being cases in which courts hold class arbitration
waivers unenforceable.
In a number of recent cases, the drafter of an arbitration clause has
opposed severing an invalid class arbitration waiver from the arbitration
clause. 112  In such cases, the drafting party asserts--often with the
agreement of the nondrafting party-that the entire arbitration clause
should be thrown out if the class arbitration waiver is invalidated. In
addition, an increasing number of arbitration clauses contain
"nonseverability" provisions, which provide that the class arbitration
waiver is not severable from the arbitration clause." 3  In a sample of
"See supra text accompanying notes 77-79.
"'E.g., Booker v. Robert Half Int'l, Inc., 413 F.3d 77, 84-85 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
112Oestreicher v. Alienware Corp., 502 F.Supp. 2d 1061, 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2007)
("Alienware agrees that this case should not be referred to arbitration if the class action
waiver is unenforceable."); Massie v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 2007 Cal. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 3818, at *31-*32 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) ("In light of our conclusion that Ralphs'
class action waivers are wholly inconsistent with the reasoning of Discover Bank...
and Ralphs' reiteration of its disinterest in arbitration if it cannot enforce its class
action waivers, we need not resolve any question of severance of this or any other
provision of the arbitration agreement.") (emphasis added); Firchow v. Citibank, 2007
Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 178, at *35-*36 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) ("In the case at bar,
however, the trial court found - and both parties agree - the waiver provision
permeates the entire purpose of the agreement to arbitrate and cannot be severed.")
(emphasis added); Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless, 857 N.E.2d 250, 276 (11. 2006)
("Cingular argues that the appellate court erred by severing the class action waiver
from the remainder of the arbitration clause.") (emphasis added); Scott, 161 P.3d at
1009 (Wash. 2007) ("By its terms, the class action waiver is not severable from the
arbitration clause. . . . Because no party argues for severability, we enforce the
language of the agreement between the parties and conclude that the entirety of the
arbitration clause is null and void.") (emphasis added). But see Skirchak v. Dynamics
Research Corp., 508 F.3d 49, 63 (1st Cir. 2007) ("At oral argument we asked the
parties whether each would prefer to be in arbitration even if the class action waiver
clause was stricken. The company said it would prefer to be in arbitration; the plaintiffs
agreed.").
Cohen v. DIRECTV, Inc., 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 813, 815 n.4 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) ("A
court may sever any portion of Section 9 [the dispute resolution clause] that it finds to
be unenforceable, except for the prohibition on class or representative arbitration.");
Parrish v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 2005 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 9021, at *21 (Cal.
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franchise arbitration clauses from 2007, three of twenty-eight (or 10.7%)
included a nonseverability provision, up from none in 1999. Even more
strikingly, 60% of consumer arbitration clauses collected by Eisenberg and
Miller in 2007 contained a nonseverability provision.14
Such clauses reflect serious reservations about class arbitration by
some drafting parties. As franchise lawyer Lewis Goldfarb has stated:
"[Class arbitration] leaves defendants with the worst of all worlds-the
threat of a class action in a forum without the procedural, evidentiary and
appellate protections available through the judicial process." ' 15 A number
of reasons have been given for this dislike:
* Courts can vacate class arbitration awards, like other arbitration
awards, only on limited grounds. 16 Class arbitrations-and class
actions-can have high stakes, and drafting parties may prefer the
availability of appellate review in such important cases.
" Class arbitration may be significantly more costly than a series of
individual arbitrations, "since each of the interim phases related to
class-and merits-arbitral awards will carry with them potential
burdens relating to discovery, briefing, hearings, and time, money
and effort spent in obtaining judicial review at each of the various
phases, which will not necessarily be present in individual
arbitrations.,"'17
" Parties may feel the need to choose a different arbitrator in class
arbitration (i.e., an arbitrator with expertise in aggregate litigation)
Ct. App. 2005) ("If this specific proviso is found to be unenforceable, then the entirety
of this arbitration clause shall be null and void."); Scott v. Cingular Wireless, 161 P.3d
1000, 1003 n.2 (Wash. 2007) ("If this specific proviso is found to be unenforceable,
then the entirety of this arbitration clause shall be null and void."); see Hilary B. Miller,
Arbitration and Class Actions After JAMS' Flip-Flop, N.Y.L.J., May 4, 2005, at 4, 7
("In response to Bazzle, many lenders have begun modifying their consumer arbitration
clauses to include . . . a severability clause that provides that if the court refuses to
enforce the class-action waiver, then the entire arbitration clause is void, and the class
action will proceed in court rather than in arbitration."). For sample provisions, see
infra Appendix.
"
4Eisenberg et al., supra note 18, at 885 table 4.
15Class Actions in Arbitration-An Idea Whose Time Should Pass, METROPOLITAN
CORPORATE COUNSEL, Apr. 2006, at 25 (interview with Lewis Goldfarb); see also
Patrick E. Gaas, The Evolving Unpredictability of Class Arbitration, FOR THE DEFENSE,
June 2005, at 37, 39 ("class arbitration may be worse for the corporate defendant than
class action litigation."); Sternlight, supra note 9, at 117-18 ("It is not at all clear,
however, that classwide arbitration will be a popular choice."). But see Smit, supra note
25, at 210 ("The class action in arbitration presently offered by the institutions is far
preferable, from their point of view, to the judicial class action they will wind up with if
their waiver clause is upheld.").
116Deruelle & Roesch, supra note 55, at 9 ("[T]he scope of review available for an
arbitrator's ruling is significantly limited.").
171Id.
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than in individual arbitration (in which the parties could choose an
arbitrator with industry expertise, for example).1 18
e At least under AAA procedures, many important filings in class
arbitration proceedings-including the identity of the parties, the
demand for arbitration, and any awards-are publicly available
documents. 1 9
The opposition to class arbitration is reflected in the legal literature, with
commentators counseling businesses to include nonseverability provisions
with their class arbitration waivers. 1
20
It may seem surprising that both drafting parties and non-drafting
parties would agree that invalid class arbitration waivers should not be
severed from otherwise enforceable arbitration clauses. In fact, such an
outcome is consistent with a very simple set of underlying preferences.
Assume that non-drafting parties (and their lawyers) would most prefer to
end up in a class action in court. From their perspective, class arbitration is
the second best outcome, while individual arbitration is their least favored
choice. Consistent with these preferences, the individual would challenge
the enforceability of the class arbitration waiver in court, and argue that an
invalid class arbitration waiver is not severable from the arbitration clause.
181d.
119AAA Class Arbitration Rules, supra note 68, Rule 9(a).
120Kathleen M. Scanlon, Class Arbitration Waivers: The "Severability" Doctrine and
Its Consequences, DISP. RESOL. J., Feb.-Apr. 2007, at 40, 44 ("A practical approach is
to include in future arbitration clauses that contain a class arbitration waiver an explicit
provision making the entire arbitration clause unenforceable in the event a court strikes
the waiver provision. By drafting the agreement in this manner, the parties can
eliminate the severability option and avoid the possibility of having to participate in an
unwanted class arbitration."); Donald M Falk & Archis A. Parasharami, Federal Court
Rejects Class Action Waivers in Arbitration Clauses (Oct. 6, 2006), available at
http://www.mayerbrown.com/news/article.asp?id=3944 ("Businesses would therefore
be wise to guard against being forced into class arbitration-which appears far riskier
than class litigation-by making clear in their contracts that a class-arbitration waiver is
non-severable."); Safi, supra note 33, at 1730 ("Companies can still avoid the risk of
class arbitration by supplementing a CAP [class action preclusion clause] with a
nonseverability provision, such that the entire arbitration clause stands or falls with the
CAP."); Gaas, supra note 115, at 50 ("[l]nclude anti-severability language in arbitration
agreements that state if any part of the arbitration agreement is found unenforceable, the
entire arbitration agreement is unenforceable. This will prevent an arbitrator and/or
court from compelling class arbitration if the no-class arbitration provision is declared
unenforceable."); The Current State of Class Action Arbitration, 22 ALTERNATIVES TO
HIGH COST LITIG. 63, 68 (2004) ("Kaplinsky also recommended that drafters create an
exception to the severability clause in their arbitration agreements 'because, if in fact a
court were to hold that the class action waiver is unconscionable, you don't want either
a court or an arbitrator to sever that language from your clause. Because then you might
end up where Green Tree ended up-that is, you then have a silent clause and you
might end up in class-wide arbitration."') (quoting Alan Kaplinsky).
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Meanwhile, from the drafting party's perspective, one can assume
that individual arbitration is the preferred outcome. But as between class
arbitration and class actions, it is certainly plausible for the drafting party to
prefer class actions in court. Such an assumption is consistent with the
strong dislike that some businesses have for class arbitration.1 21 Given
these preferences, the drafting party would defend the enforceability of both
the arbitration clause and the class arbitration waiver in court. But if the
court holds the class arbitration waiver invalid, the drafting party would
then oppose severing the waiver from the arbitration clause.
These preferences are illustrated in Table 2. Once a court
invalidates the class arbitration waiver (and individual arbitration is no
longer an option), class actions in court become the favored option for both
parties; the drafting party and the non-drafting party favor a class action
over class arbitration. 22
Table 2. Ex Post Preference Rankings
Drafting Party Non-drafting Party
Individual Arbitration 1 3
Class Arbitration 3 2
Class Action 2 1
The effect of nonseverability provisions (and a more general
preference of some drafting parties for class actions over class arbitration)
is that when courts invalidate class arbitration waivers, disputes will likely
end up as putative class actions in court--even though the parties' contract
includes an arbitration clause. Thus, at least in those jurisdictions that have
held class arbitration waivers to be unconscionable, class actions are unlikely
to become extinct. 1
23
B. Class Actions and the Choice Between Arbitration and Litigation
121See supra text accompanying notes 115-20.
122Note that the preferences summarized in Table 2 are ex post preferences-that is, the
parties' preferences after the dispute arises. It is reasonable to assume that the drafting
party's preferences are consistent before and after a dispute arises, at least in many
cases. But the non-drafting party's preferences may be different once a claim has arisen.
So, Table 2 should not be construed as indicating that the parties would be better off ex
ante without an arbitration clause.
123Assuming, of course, that the Supreme Court does not hold that the FAA preempts
such unconscionability decisions. See supra text accompanying notes 101-08.
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B. Class Actions and the Choice Between Arbitration and Litigation
Moreover, even in jurisdictions that uphold class arbitration
waivers, there is strong reason to believe that class actions will not become
extinct. Although an arbitration clause acts as a class action waiver by
precluding a case from proceeding in court (whether as a class action or
otherwise), the overall effect of arbitration clauses on class actions depends
on how widely used arbitration clauses are. If drafting parties do not
include arbitration clauses in their contracts, obviously there is no
arbitration clause to act as a class action waiver.
124
The available empirical evidence shows that the use of arbitration
clauses varies widely across different types of contracts, as summarized in
Table 3. Fewer than half (43.7%) of a sample of franchise agreements
included arbitration clauses in 2007.125 Over 75% (20 of 26) of the
consumer contracts studied by Eisenberg et al. contained arbitration
clauses. 126 By contrast, Demaine and Hensler found that from 0% to 69.2%
of an array of consumer contracts included arbitration clauses in their 2004
study. 127  Of the consumer software license agreements examined by
Marotta-Wurgler, only 6.0% contained arbitration clauses. 128 The data on
employment contracts likewise is mixed.
29
Table 3. Use of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Clauses by Type of Contract
130
Industry Percentage of Sample Size
Contracts with
Arbitration Clause
Consumer - Housing and Home 37.1% n35
Services
Consumer - Retail Services 30.0% n=10
Consumer - Transportation 50.0% n=20
124On occasion, drafting parties include class action waivers in contracts that do not
include arbitration clauses. Such provisions are relatively rare, however, and we have
been unable to find any cases in which they have been enforced. See supra note 25.
125Drahozal & Wittrock, supra note 18, at 95.
126Eisenberg et al., supra note 18.
127Demaine & Hensler, supra note 22, at 63 table 2.
118Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 87, at 60 table 4.4.
'
29Brett A. Smith & Joshua L. Schwarz, Keeping Lawyers Out of Court? A Survey of the
Prevalence of Compulsory Arbitration Agreements in Law Firms, 7 EMPL. RTs. &
EMPLOY. POL'Y J. 183, 197-98 & table 2 (2003) (10% of law firm contracts included
arbitration clauses); Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of
CEO Employment Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For?, 63 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 231, 234 (2006) (41.6% of CEO contracts included arbitration clauses).
130 This table is an updated and revised version of the table that appears in Christopher
R. Drahozal, Is Arbitration Lawless?, 40 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 187, 210-12 (2006).
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Consumer - Health Care 35.3% n=17
Consumer - Food & Entertainment 0% n=20
Consumer - Travel 13.6% n=22
Consumer - Financial 69.2% n=26
Consumer - Financial, Cable, and 76.9% n26
Cell Phone
Consumer - Software License 6.0% n-259
Agreements
Employment - Law Firms 10.0% n=200
Employment - CEOs 41.6% n=375
Franchising 43.7% n=71
The variations in the use of pre-dispute arbitration clauses across
consumer, employment, and franchise contracts makes it very unlikely that
arbitration clauses will cause class actions to become extinct. 3 1 Even if it
is the case (as it may well be) that the use of arbitration clauses is positively
correlated with the drafting party's risk of being subject to a class action,
class actions will continue to be brought unless the use of arbitration
clauses increases dramatically.
Professor Gilles argues that if class arbitration waivers are upheld,
all businesses will incorporate arbitration clauses into their contracts to
preclude class relief. She explains:
But I regard it as inevitable that firms will ultimately act in
their in their economic best interests, and those interests
dictate that virtually all companies will opt out of exposure
to class action liability. Why wouldn't they? Once the
waivers gain broader acceptance and recognition, it will
become malpractice for corporate counsel not to include
such clauses in consumer and other class-action-prone
contracts. 1
32
And once the use of arbitration clauses (together with class arbitration
waivers) becomes ubiquitous, according to Professor Gilles, the class action
will disappear.' 
33
But the empirical evidence does not support such an assertion. The
percentage of the sample of franchise agreements using arbitration clauses
was essentially unchanged between 1999 and 2007, decreasing slightly
131This is not even considering the fact that the securities arbitration rules exclude
claims involved in class actions from securities arbitration proceedings. See FINRA
Code of Arbitration Procedure for Consumer Disputes, R. 12204, available at
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display.html?rbid=2403&element-id=41 10 (last
visited Mar. 13, 2009).
132Gilles, supra note 5, at 377.
3id. at 375.
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from 45% to 43.7%. 134 Anecdotal reports suggest that if anything the use of
arbitration clauses is falling in recent years.13 5 Even before the recent court
decisions striking down class arbitration waivers, use of arbitration clauses
was mixed, as the data in Table 3 (most of which pre-date the recent court
decisions) indicate.
The explanation is straight forward: while an arbitration clause acts
as a class action waiver, that is not all it does. A party including an
arbitration clause in its contract is specifying a bundle of characteristics of
the dispute resolution process, only one of which is the availability of class
relief. Parties may prefer arbitration for any number of reasons-including
expert decision-making, quicker and cheaper dispute resolution processes,
privacy, and so on. Conversely, there are various reasons why parties
might not agree to arbitration-such as for disputes likely to involve
emergency actions and bet-the-company stakes. 136  As a result, some
drafting parties will continue-indeed, have continued-to choose litigation
even though arbitration clauses may preclude the availability of class relief.
So long as that remains true, class actions will not become extinct.
VII. CONCLUSION
We take no position on the normative pros and cons of class actions
(or class arbitrations) as a means of resolving disputes arising out of
consumer, employment, and franchise contracts. Our perspective here is
simply a descriptive one: we consider the question of whether arbitration
clauses are likely to result in the extinction of the class action.
In our view, the answer is no-arbitration clauses are not likely to
result in the extinction of the class action. We reach this conclusion for two
main reasons. First, at least some parties that draft standard form contracts
prefer class actions to class arbitrations. This preference is illustrated by
the growing use of nonseverability provisions, which provide that if the
class arbitration waiver is held unenforceable the entire arbitration clause
should be stricken. As a result, the recent court decisions invalidating class
arbitration waivers will result in the invalidation of arbitration clauses as
well, so that the cases will proceed as putative class actions in court.
Second, and more fundamentally, arbitration clauses bundle a
variety of characteristics-including but not limited to acting as a class
action waiver-into a single means of dispute resolution. Not all drafting
parties will agree to arbitration, even if they might prefer individual
arbitrations to class actions. The empirical evidence is consistent with this
view, as the use of pre-dispute arbitration clauses varies widely in
134Drahozal & Wittrock, supra note 18, at 95.
1351d. at 72-73. The empirical evidence does not support the existence of a flight from
arbitration, however, as noted above. See supra text accompanying notes 21-23.
136Drahozal & Wittrock, supra note 18, at 78-80.
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consumer, employment, and franchise contracts. So long as not all
contracts include arbitration clauses, and we see no evidence suggesting
that they will, class actions will not become extinct.
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APPENDIX
Sample Clauses:
Class Action Waivers, Class Arbitration Waivers,
and Nonseverability Provisions
Class Action Waivers
Hungry Howie's Franchise Agreement
29. CLASS ACTION SUITS Franchise Owner waives, to the
fullest extent permitted by law, the right to bring, or be a class member in,
any class action suit relating to any dispute, controversy or claim arising out
of [or] related to this Agreement or arising out of any breach or alleged
breach of this Agreement.
Jackson Hewitt, Inc. Franchise Agreement
28.7. No class actions. You agree that for our Network to
function properly, we cannot be burdened with the costs of litigating
network-wide disputes. You agree that any dispute between you and us is
unique as to its facts, and you shall not institute, join or participate in any
class action against us or our Affiliates.
Class Arbitration Waivers
AAMCO Transmissions, Inc. Franchise Agreement
28. Mediation and Arbitration....
(b) ... The parties specifically acknowledge and agree that no class
action and multiparty claims shall be filed in any such arbitration
proceeding pursuant to the terms of this Agreement.
Computer Renaissance Franchise Agreement
17.A. Arbitration ... Any dispute and any arbitration will be
conducted and resolved on an individual basis only and not a class-wide,
multiple plaintiff, or similar basis. Any such arbitration proceeding will not
be consolidated with any other arbitration proceeding involving other any
other person, except for disputes involving affiliates of the parties to such
arbitration.
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Taco John's International, Inc. Franchise Agreement
17.10 (d) (iii) Arbitration. ... The parties agree that
arbitration shall be conducted on an individual basis, except as
specifically provided below. The parties agree further that arbitration
shall not be conducted on a class-wide basis.
You may commence an arbitration as a claimant together with
other franchisees of Taco John's Restaurant franchisees as co-
claimants, subject to the following conditions:
(1) the claims of the other franchisees must present issues of
fact or law in common with your claims; and
(2) at any time during the conduct of the arbitration, the total
number of Taco John's Restaurants owned by the claimants in the
arbitration may not exceed fifteen percent (15%) of the total number of
franchised Taco John's Restaurants in operation.
You may consolidate any arbitration in which you are the
claimant with other arbitrations in which other Taco John's
Restaurants franchisees are claimants, subject to the following
conditions:
(1) the claims of the other franchisees in the other arbitrations
must present issues of fact or law in common with your claims in your
arbitration proceeding; and
(2) at any time during the conduct of the consolidated
arbitration, the total number of Taco John's Restaurants owned by the
claimants in the consolidated arbitration may not exceed fifteen
percent (15%) of the total number of franchised Taco John's
Restaurants in operation.
If a claim which is subject to arbitration under this Agreement
is properly the subject of a class action, then the party making that
claim may, in its discretion, elect either to assert it as a single-party
claim (as opposed to a claim on behalf of a class) in the arbitration, or
to file it as a class action in a court of competent jurisdiction, pursuant
to the laws and rules applicable to that court. If the court refuses to
allow the matter to proceed as a class action, whether by refusing to
certify a class or otherwise, then the party asserting the claim may not
pursue it further in court, and if that party wishes to assert the claim
further, then the party must submit it to arbitration in accordance with
the provisions of this Paragraph 17.10.
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Nonseverability Provisions
ChemDry Franchise Agreement
17.F. Arbitration ... HRI and FRANCHISEE agree that
arbitration shall be conducted on an individual, not a class-wide basis and
that an arbitration proceeding between HRI and FRANCHISEE and their
respective affiliates, shareholders, officers, directors, agents, and/or
employees shall not be consolidated with any other arbitration proceeding
involving HRI and any other person. The parties further agree that if this
Paragraph is held by any court, agency or tribunal with competent
jurisdiction to be: (a) invalid, (b) contrary to, or (c) in conflict with, any
applicable present or future law or regulation, the entire Section 17.F will
be deemed null and void.
SignsNow Franchise Agreement
17.G. ARBITRATION. ... We and you agree that arbitration will
be conducted on an individual, not a class-wide, basis and that an
arbitration proceeding between us and our affiliates, and our and their
respective shareholders, officers directors, agents, and/or employees, and
you (and/or your owners, guarantors, affiliates, and/or employees) may not
be consolidated with any other arbitration proceeding between us and any
other person. Notwithstanding the foregoing or anything to the contrary
in this Section 17.G or Section 17.B, if any court or arbitrator
determines that all or any part of the preceding sentence is
unenforceable with respect to a dispute that otherwise would be subject
to arbitration under this Section 17.G, then all parties agree that this
arbitration clause will not apply to that dispute and that such dispute
shall be resolved in a judicial proceeding in accordance with this
Section 17 (excluding this Section 17.G).
Snap-On Tools Standard Franchise Agreement
25.B. Arbitration. ... In the event any provision in this Section 25,
other than the prohibition against consolidation, joinder and class action, is
determined to be legally invalid or unenforceable under the law applicable
in a particular case, then it is the intention of the parties to this Agreement
that such provision be deemed inoperative and stricken from this
Agreement, and that the remainder of this Section 25, to the extent not
legally invalid or unenforceable under applicable law, be enforced as
written as if the invalid or unenforceable provision or provisions had not
been included in this Section 25. If the prohibition against consolidation,
joinder and class action is determined to be legally invalid or unenforceable
in a particular case, then it is the intent of the parties that the case shall
proceed only in any federal court of competent jurisdiction, or in the event
there is no jurisdiction in a federal court, then in that situation only, the case
shall proceed in a state court of competent jurisdiction.
